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Words strain, 
Crack and sometimes break, under the burden, 
Under the tension, slip, slide, perish, 
Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place, 
Will not stay still. 
T.S.Eliot, The Four Quartets 
Words strain and sometimes break under the burden of their explicit or implicit 
meanings. The implications of two words in this article's title, coherence and 
consistency, assume startlingly huge proportions when properly understood in 
their EU context. For placing one over the other has the potential to signif)' 
entirely opposite visions for how Europe conceives ofits place on the global stage. 
Ideology, political will and the prioritisation of various foreign policy phil-
osophies - the devil, indeed, is in the detail. 
Ask Fiona Black, head of the Jamaican Dairy Producers Association: 'To what 
extent is EU agricultural policy coherent with its commitment to international 
development?" and her exasperate response tells the tale of poor country 
farmers' livelihoods devasted by the dumping of EU milk products in their 
market. Whole communities' economies wrecked and sustainable agricultural 
practices rendered unviable by EU subsidies that produce artificially cheap 
products benefiting a fraction of the under 5 per cent of Europe's population 
engaged in farming. 
This article seeks to assess EU mechanisms for policy coherence in external 
relations. Debates over the future of the European Union are much preoccupied 
by the attempt to engineer coherence and CO!)sistency in EU actions. The split 
over the US-led war on Iraq in Spring 2003 brought European divisions into 
harsh focus; the nascent 'Common Foreign and Security Policy' reduced to 
something of a joke in the eyes of many. Yet attempts to engineer a more 
cohesive European Union in foreign policy risk opting for structural shake-ups 
that may fail to resolve political differences at the heart of such 'incoherence'. 
Furthermore, institutional reform which purports to be technical may actually 
reflect a political change which downgrades credible development policies and 
institutions in the name of'consistency'. 
Origins of the coherence debate 
Coherence was first introduced in the Maastricht Treaty, which stated that: 'The 
Community shall take account of the objectives referred to in Article 130 U in 
the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries. "1 
Despite the weak wording ('take account of) the principle of coherence was 
explicitly pro-development: namely that other EU external policies should be 
'coherent' with development commitments. 2 The Amsterdam Treaty introduced 
the concept of' consistency' which emphasises that all EU external actions should 
be 'consistent' with the Common Foreign and Security Policy.3 Stronger wording 
in early versions of that text indicated that development was to be subordinate 
to foreign policy.4 
EU decision-making and development 
The European Union probably has the most complex decision making system 
of any multilateral set of institutions. Fifteen Member State governments, civil 
services and parliaments, the European Parliament, the European Commission, 
special-interest groups and countless Courts, Committees and consultative 
bodies all input. Coherence of policies might be important in principle, but 
incoherence is often a given. Causes are manifold. In some cases it may constitute 
the best compromise, a balancing act, in which the relative importance of the 
actions and actors has been duly weighed. 
Even in authoritarian regimes, government is never a unitary whole. In such 
a complex system policy incoherencies can easily appear. European Community 
development cooperation, the aid resources pooled at EC level, receives Member 
State oversight through various fora deciding on investments, political dialogue 
with developing countries and aid programmes. Member States are often 
accused of micro-management by committees and resolutions. It is clear that the 
paperwork from one side has relatively little influence on the other.5 
European decision-making is particularly beleagured by competing national 
interests. Helen Wallace has suggested that there is an 'inherent instability' in 
European policy.6 Considerable political differences across the EU make co-
ordinated and coherent development policy based on shared principles difficult. 
This may increase as the EU enlarges; with new Member States bringing new 
regional priorities and technical approaches to the mix. 
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A brief history of EU mechanisms for coherence7 
Following the Maastricht Treaty commitment to coherence, the Council of 
Development Ministers urged the European Commission to undertake a study 
of iLS practical implication . Two year laLer nothing had been produced. 
Fir l tep were the result of civil s iely pres ure. In Apri l 1993 s . tarted 
a campaign againstart.ific.ially EU-sub idj ed meatexpons being dumped in We t 
Africa and disrupting the local meat markei:s.8 Th 1b idies Aagrantly under-
mined Europeari aid projects in Sabel countries to encourage meat production. 
The incoherence between EU development and trade policy was a key criticism 
used by the NGOs. Eventually, pressure mounted from Member States and the 
European Commission was forced to publish a report admitting the incoherence 
and make adjustments to the subsidies. Soon afterwards the Netherlands pro-
posed thata mechanism be adopted for identifying present and future problems 
ofincoherence. Belgium proposed holdingjoint sessions of the Agriculture and 
Development Councils. Neither suggestion has yet been acted upon. 
In February 2000 the Directorate General for Development circulated a first 
draft paper calJed 'Toward improved coher n e betw en the ommuniLy 
development policy and oLher omm unity policies'. It contain d a rilical 
analysis of trade, agricultural, fisherie policies and tJ1 E budget to a. esswhere 
development policy could 'b affi cted or even contradicted'. Fo lt ·ing aid on 
middle-income councrie Jjk K · v and Turkey was cit cl as an example of 
incoherence with poverty reduction commitments. The document called for a 
'realistic and pragmatic approach'. The document went too far, was too critical 
and got buried without being published. 
A watered-down Commission paperwas published with the word 'coherence' 
substituted by 'consistency'. Little was achieved. The proposal for 'Focal Points 
for Policy Consistency' across the Commission was never implemented. Instead 
Directorates A and Bin the Commission's DG Development monitor decisions 
in other DGs that impact on development. A 'Quality Support Group' within DG 
Development was installed in the early 1990s. It attempted to institute common 
project design and approval systems; such as through log-frame methods, 
streamlined financial procedures and budget lines. 
In 2001 the EuropeAid Cooperation Office was established as the implemen-
tation agency for European aid. This followed three evaluations which had all 
criticised the weak institutional setting, red tape and time-consuming approval 
pro e se in the variou · DCs previously r p nsibl for aid. Jes mail t<l ks ar to 
improve lh gualily of proj t managem nt, to r duce th time for project 
impl mentation, to improve 6nan ial procedure and t improve impact an I 
visibility of European aid programmes. With more Lhan 1,000 Laffin 2002, 
40 EUR OPE IN THE WORLD 
EuropeAid oversees 7.6 billion euro in more than 150 countries. The separation 
from policy formulation in DG External Relations, DG Development and DG 
Trade now constitutes the latest split in responsibility for development. 
Since 2001, an 'Interservice Quality Support Group' (iQSG) has been 
established under Development Commissioner Nielson. It consists of twelve 
representatives from the different RELEX DGs and has its own secretariat. Its 
focus has been monitoring all Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) for EC aid 
recipient countries. Commission guidelines stipulate that CSPs should contain 
a coherence paragraph which identifies incoherencies and outlines the chosen 
policy mix. In principle this could be an important step. But until now 
insufficient research capacity has been invested. Furthermore no instruments 
have been implemented to monitor and evaluate the CSP analysis for a wider use 
in the Commission or Council. 
Assessing the coherence mechanisms 
The OECD provides a helpful analysis of the tools required for policy coherence: 
political leadership, strategic policy framework, central overview and coordin-
ation capacity, clear definition and good analysis, mechanisms to detect and 
resolve policy conflicts, reconciliation between policy priorities and budgetary 
imperatives, monitoring mechanisms and a conducive administrative culture. 
Of all these, political leadership is most clearly lacking in the EU. Develop-
ment cooperation is generally accorded only a junior ministerial portfolio in 
most EU Member States. Heads of state rarely get involved. 
But let us be clea1~ leadership has also failed to come from the European 
Commission. When it came with doc um en ts, it came late and half-hearted. Thus 
coordination capacity and mechanisms were delayed and weak. DG Develop-
ment proposals were watered down beyond credibility. More monitoring and 
analytical capacity and more research funds to evaluate the impact of EU policies 
will be crucial. Most importantly, a work culture which encourages staff to 
confront difficult and controversial coherence issues should be supported by EU 
leaders and the policy framework. At present strategic direction from the top is 
clearly lacking. 
Coherence and/or consistency? 
The cacaphony of voices that constitute Europe's presence on the global stage 
is doutless an embarrasment. Improving 'policy coherence' is a worthy aim for 
any politician. But we must ask ourselves: "Towards what ends?" 
In a worrying trend, development policy and intruments are increasingly 
discussed as 'tools' for promoting Europe's 'strategic interests'. Coherence of 
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trade or security ·with pro-poor commitments was totally absent as a concept 
under the Convention on the Future of Europe. Indeed, Convention proposals 
re-interpreted 'coherence' as 'consistency': development subordinated to 
foreign policy. Ten years on and we are in danger of regressing, not progressing. 
Key lessons learned include: 
• The next EU Treaty must reaffirm the commitment to coherence of trade, 
agriculture, fisheries and security policies v,.j_th development commitments. 
• The Maastrich t Treaty wording 'taking into account development policy' must 
be strengthened, not weakened or inverted. 
• NGOs and progressive Member States must work together to hold the EU to 
account. 
• Successful campaigns are based on concrete cases (meat, milk powder, 
fisheries). 
1 Article 130 VofTitle XVI\ of the Treaty on European Union, CEC/CEC, 1992:61 
2 Article 130U (Article 177 in the Treaty of Amsterdam) is the first Article with relation to 
development co-operation in the Treaty of Maastricht. It sets out the general development 
objectives for the Community [CEC/CEC, 1992:61] 
3 "The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of lls external activities as a whole in the 
context of its external relations, security, economic and development pollcies. Tl1e Council and the 
Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency. They shall ensure the 
implementation of these policies, each in accordance with its respective powers." 
4 In the Luxembourg version tabled in June 1991 the last part of the article still stated: "The 
Community and its Member States shall ensure that there development policies are consistent 
with the common foreign and security policy." 
5 As was one of the conclusions of the Lo me, ALA and Med evaluations published in 1998. See for 
example: Montes, C./Migliorsi, S., Evaluation of European Union Aid to ACP countries. Synthesis 
Report. Brussels, November 1998. 
6 "European policy reg.imes·are conditional ratherthan definitive, a consequence of the continuing 
fluidity of the political setting of less than a policy, pulled between the political territories of the 
member states and the pressures of global and European influences." 1996:28 
7 A more detailed version of this history is available from the BOND EU website: 
http://www.bond.org.uk/eu 
8 A German study concluded that the meat exports of Mali and Burkina Faso in the period 1985-93 
could have been 20-40 per cent higher if there had been no subsidised exports of frozen meat to 
Ivory Coast from the EU. See Brandt [1994]. Eurostep, 1993a; Eurostep, 1993b; Klugkist, 1993/1994 
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National Advisory 
Council (Netherlands) 
Solagral (French 
Research Institute) 
Report annually to the EC • greater transparency 
Council and the European and openness 
Parliament 
Complaints procedure/ 
Inspection Panel 
Screening test 
Working group of civil 
servants of different DGs 
Group of experts for 
assessment studies 
• greater transparency 
and openness 
• initiatives not solely by 
Commission and 
therefore wider-ranging 
• decisions would have to 
be weighed 
• decisions would have to 
be weighed 
• better assessments 
• solid weighing of 
decisions 
• could be defensive and 
thus ritualistic 
• more paper work 
• needs investigative 
capacity 
•red tape 
• window dressing 
• sometimes difficult to b.e 
assessed 
• lack of transparency 
• purely bureaucratic 
• responsibilities unclear 
• could be symbolic 
• could involve 
unnecessary paperwork 
---- -------·----------w-----------
Church Conference 
(Germany) 
Government of 
Denmark 
Government of the 
Netherlands 
Eurostep 
First Nielson Proposal 
-· ·--Second Nielson 
Proposal 
Government of the 
Netherlands 
Regular consultations 
between European and 
ACP ministers 
System for assessment 
and evaluation 
Discussions in Council 
• greater transparency 
and openness 
• better assessments 
• solid weighing of 
decisions 
• developing set of 
indicators 
• discover unintei1tional 
concrete cases 
• ritualistic/not transparent 
• no clear procedures 
• private initiative left out 
• no clear responsibilities 
• could be symbolic 
• could involve 
unnecessary paperwork 
• results unclear 
• behind closed doors, 
transparency lacking 
-----------------·--------
Complaints procedure 
Commission 
Discussions in Council on 
food security/fisheries, 
conflict prevention, 
migration 
Impact Assessments 
Regular Reporting 
Joint Council meetings 
Coherence Office 
•<f--
Coherence Focal Points 
across the Commission 
---·----· 
Focal Point in DGDev 
Discussions on coherence 
in every Council meeting 
• possibility to present 
incoherences 
• stimulating debate 
• discover unknown 
territories 
• transparency not 
secured 
• better insight in results 
• stimulate debate 
• better decision making 
• autonomous analysis 
• data base 
• contact point 
• detection of 
incoherences 
• stimulating debate 
• investigative capacity 
lacking 
• results unclear 
• not leading to 
instruments/bureaucratic 
procedures 
• could be ritualistic 
• much paperwork 
• depends on place in 
hierarchy 
• avoiding the real issues 
• not transparent 
---
• could become ritualistic 
